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AN EFFECTIVE BUT UNREPORTED APPLICATION OF 
LAFLER & FRYE 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
QUEENS COUNTY 
People v. Verni1 
(decided March 29, 2012) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 22, 2009 Michael Verni was found wounded 
inside of his automobile with a firearm between his legs.2  He later 
admitted that he owned the firearm and had shot himself, which cul-
minated in his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the 
second degree.3  Prior to sentencing, Verni motioned the court to set 
aside the verdict under New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 
330.30.4  First, he alleged that his right to effective assistance of 
counsel was violated when his attorney failed to convey a plea offer 
to him.5  Second, he alleged that his right to an impartial jury was vi-
olated because a sworn juror failed to disclose that she was a former 
neighbor of defendant’s and held a bias against him.6  Ultimately, the 
court held Verni’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was “un-
supported in fact or law” and there was no basis for his claim of juror 
bias.7 
 
1 No. 2014/10, 2012 WL 1059382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012). 
2 Id. at *1. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 330.30 governs when a verdict of guilty 
may be set aside.  Under subsection one a guilty verdict may be set aside if “[a]ny ground 
appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal . . . would require reversal or modifi-
cation of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court.”  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
330.30(1) (McKinney 2013). 
5 Verni, 2012 WL 1059382, at *1. 
6 Id.  While the court addressed the claims of juror bias, it will not be discussed in detail in 
this Note. 
7 Id. at *6-*7. 
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II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
An analysis of the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
first begins with the right to counsel itself.  The right to counsel is 
guaranteed by both the Federal and New York State Constitutions.8  
Additionally, in Strickland v. Washington9 the Supreme Court stated 
“that the right to counsel [includes] the right to [receive] the effective 
assistance of counsel.”10  In Strickland, the Supreme Court outlined a 
two-pronged test in order to determine whether a defendant received 
the effective assistance of counsel.11  The Strickland test requires that 
a defendant show a) his “counsel’s representation fell below an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness,” and b) the deficient conduct 
caused him prejudice.12 
Under New York law, the current test as to whether a defend-
ant received the effective assistance of counsel was adopted by the 
New York Court of Appeals in People v. Baldi.13  In Baldi, which 
was decided prior to Strickland, the court held that the question of 
whether a defendant received the effective assistance of counsel is 
based on whether he received meaningful representation based on the 
totality of circumstances.14  The New York Court of Appeals has also 
declined to adopt the Strickland test on state constitutional grounds.15   
 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (stating in pertinent part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); N.Y. 
CONST art. I, § 6 (stating in pertinent part that “[i]n any trial in any court whatever the party 
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . . .”). 
9 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
10 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 
(1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 687-88. 
13 429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1981). 
14 Id. at 405. 
15 People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (N.Y. 1998) (discussing that prejudice is 
viewed generally in its overall determination of whether defendant received meaningful rep-
resentation).  The court further stated: 
          While the inquiry focuses on the quality of the representation pro-
vided to the accused, the claim of ineffectiveness is ultimately concerned 
with the fairness of the process as a whole rather than its particular im-
pact on the outcome of the case.  In that regard, we have refused to apply 
the harmless error doctrine in cases involving substantiated claims of in-
effective assistance.  Thus, whether defendant would have been acquit-
ted of the charges but for counsel’s errors is relevant, but not dispositive 
2
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While the right to effective assistance is guaranteed by both 
Federal and New York Constitutions, it is not clear whether the Baldi 
test provides for greater protections than Strickland.  The result of 
this uncertainty is made clear by the court in Verni as it analyzed the 
representation received by defendant under both Strickland and 
Baldi.16  While the Court of Appeals’ refusal to adopt Strickland rais-
es a question as to whether Baldi provides defendants with greater 
protection,17 another question remains: What differences, if any, exist 
in between the New York and Federal approach to claims of ineffec-
tive assistance during guilty pleas? 
III. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING PLEA BARGAINING 
In Strickland, David Leroy Washington faced the death penal-
ty after perpetrating a string of heinous crimes including “three brutal 
stabbing murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults . . . attempted 
extortion, and theft.”18  Faced with the death penalty, Washington 
was appointed an experienced defense attorney who began his work 
with vigor.19  However, against his counsel’s advice, defendant con-
fessed to two of the murders, “waived his right to a jury trial . . . and 
pleaded guilty to all charges, including three capital murder charg-
es.”20  Defendant’s actions caused counsel to feel hopeless about his 
client’s case.21  During the plea colloquy, defendant stated to the 
judge that he was under “extreme stress” at the time he perpetrated 
the crimes because he was unable to provide for his family.22  De-
fendant also stated that “he had no significant prior criminal record” 
 
under the State constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of coun-
sel.  The safeguards provided under the Constitution must be applied in 
all cases to be effective and, for that reason, our legal system is con-
cerned as much with the integrity of the judicial process as with the issue 
of guilt or innocence. 
Id. at 588 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 See generally Verni, 2012 WL 1059382. 
17 This issue is beyond the scope of this Note. 
18 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671-72. 
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and that “he accepted responsibility for the crimes.”23  During the 
colloquy the judge stated to Washington that “he had ‘a great deal of 
respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their re-
sponsibility.’ ”24  However, the statements made by Washington 
about his criminal history were not true.25  Again against counsel’s 
advice, Washington waived his right to an advisory jury at his sen-
tencing hearing, preferring to be sentenced solely by the judge.26  As 
his strategy to have his client’s life spared, defense counsel relied on 
the rapport, which developed during the plea colloquy, and that 
“[Washington’s] remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified 
sparing him from the death penalty.”27  Counsel worked within this 
strategy, having defendant’s “rap sheet” suppressed, and deliberately 
presented no evidence regarding his client’s emotional state in order 
to prevent opening the door to the prosecution.28  However, counsel’s 
strategy proved to be unsuccessful and the judge, having found “nu-
merous aggravating circumstances” and no mitigating factors, sen-
tenced Washington to death.29 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine 
what standards to apply to claims of actual ineffectiveness.30  Of 
great importance to the Court was the fact “that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the 
fundamental right to a fair trial.”31  The Court also noted that while a 
sentencing hearing occurs after a trial, it “is sufficiently like a trial in 
its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision, 
that counsel’s role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel’s role 
at trial—to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to pro-
 
23 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 673. 
26 Id. at 672. 
27 Id. at 672-74.  However, counsel failed to pursue interviews with defendant’s family.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672-73. 
28 Id. at 673. 
29 Id. at 674-75. 
30 Id. at 684. 
31 Id. at 684.  The Court stated that “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffective-
ness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adver-
sarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 686. 
4
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duce a just result . . . .”32  Before fashioning its two-part test,33 the 
Court explained that the right to counsel is not satisfied by the ac-
cused having a lawyer at the table next to him.34  Rather, the Sixth 
Amendment “envisions” counsel who plays the role of adversary in 
order to ensure that the system “produce just results.”35  The first 
prong, deficient conduct, requires that a “defendant . . . show that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasona-
bleness.”36  Notably, the Court conceded that it indirectly recognized 
this standard in a prior case, McMann v. Richardson,37 where the 
Court held that a guilty plea is involuntary if it is based on the inef-
fective assistance of counsel.38  Next, the Court reasoned that the 
question of whether the claimed error was unreasonable is to be 
judged on a case-by-case basis.39  All efforts to remove the effects of 
hindsight must be taken including viewing the conduct of counsel, 
their perspective of counsel at the time of the claimed error, and af-
fording counsel a “strong presumption” of reasonableness.40  In order 
to illustrate the first prong of the test, the Court listed several basic 
duties that counsel owes a defendant: “[A] duty of loyalty, a duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest,”41 a “duty to advocate defendant’s cause    
. . . to consult with defendant on important decisions[,] . . . to keep 
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution,”42 and “a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge 
as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.”43  In ad-
dition to demonstrating deficient conduct, the second prong of the 
test requires a defendant to demonstrate prejudice.44  In requiring 
prejudice, the Court reasoned that “[a]n error by counsel, even if pro-
 
32 Id. at 686-87 (citations omitted). 
33 Id. at 687. 
34 Id. at 685. 
35 Id.  “[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”  Strick-
land, 466 U.S at 686 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14). 
36 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
37 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
38 Id. at 770-71. 
39 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 688 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980)). 
42 Id. at 688. 
43 Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). 
44 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
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fessionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment 
of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”45  
In order to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must prove “that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”46  The 
Court further stated that “[a] reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”47  Finally, the 
Court in fashioning its two-part test, did not overrule McMann and 
the question of whether Strickland applies to claims of ineffective as-
sistance arising before trial was left unresolved.48 
The question of whether Strickland applied to plea bargaining 
was resolved in Hill v. Lockhart,49 where the Supreme Court applied 
the Strickland test to a guilty plea.50  In Hill, at issue was a guilty plea 
made by defendant, William Lloyd Hill, where he pled guilty to theft 
and first-degree murder in exchange for concurrent sentences of ten 
and thirty-five years respectively.51  Two years later, defendant filed 
a habeas corpus petition which asked the court to vacate his plea.52  
Defendant argued his decision was involuntary because he was in-
duced to plead guilty based on his counsel’s erroneous advice that he 
would become eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sen-
tence.53  However, because of a prior felony conviction, defendant 
was eligible for parole after serving one-half of his sentence.54 
The Court began its discussion by reiterating the requirements 
for a valid plea, or that “the plea represent[] a voluntary and intelli-
gent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the de-
fendant.”55  However, the Court refused to analyze whether counsel’s 
performance was objectively reasonable because defendant failed to 
 
45 Id. (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1981)).  Note that this also 
serves to demonstrate the Court’s concern for the integrity of the judicial system. 
46 Id. at 694. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 689. 
49 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
50 Id. at 58. 
51 Id. at 54. 
52 Id. at 54-55. 
53 Id. 
54 Hill, 474 U.S. at 55. 
55 Id. at 56 (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). 
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establish that he was prejudiced by pleading guilty.56  In order to sat-
isfy the prejudice requirement, a “defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”57  
However, because “[Hill] did not allege in his habeas petition that, 
had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, 
he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial,” the 
Court found no error in the district court’s dismissal of defendant’s 
petition without a hearing.58  With the understanding that the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel applies to the plea bargaining 
phase, the next question is: How far does it extend? 
The Supreme Court partially answered this question in Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky.59  In Padilla the Court held counsel’s conduct was 
deficient when he failed to advise his client that by accepting a plea 
he would be subject to deportation.60  In Padilla, defendant, Jose Pa-
dilla, a veteran of the Vietnam War, citizen of Honduras, and resident 
of the United States for over forty years, was charged with transport-
ing marijuana in his tractor-trailer.61  Padilla pled guilty to the charge 
in reliance on counsel’s advice that he need not worry about deporta-
tion because of his extensive tenure in the United States.62  However, 
unbeknownst to counsel, and discoverable with only minor legal re-
search, “virtually every drug offense except for only the most insig-
nificant marijuana offense[], is a deportable offense . . . .”63 
After pleading guilty, defendant raised a claim of ineffective 
assistance, asserting that but for his counsel’s erroneous advice he 
would not have pled guilty and “would have insisted on going to tri-
al.”64  In analyzing defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance, the 
Court first determined that while deportation “is not, in a strict sense, 
a criminal sanction,” it is still “intimately related to the criminal pro-
cess” and falls within the “ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to 
 
56 Id. at 60. 
57 Id. at 59. 
58 Id. at 60. 
59 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
60 Id. at 1483. 
61 Id. at 1477. 
62 Id. at 1478. 
63 Id. at 1477 n.1. 
64 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. 
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counsel.”65  Next, the Court recognized its long history in using the 
“[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Associa-
tion standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is rea-
sonable . . . .”66  The Court then acknowledged that the prevailing 
norm of the criminal Bar requires counsel to advise their client of a 
risk of deportation.67  Because counsel could have easily determined 
that by pleading guilty defendant would be subject to mandatory de-
portation, his advice provided false assurance that defendant would 
not be deported and was deficient.68  The Court then remanded the 
case back to state court in order to determine whether defendant was 
prejudiced by his plea.69  Padilla confirmed that ineffective assis-
tance of counsel applies when the deficient conduct results in the plea 
being accepted.70  Having established that the effective assistance of 
counsel is not merely a trial right, but applies to advice which results 
in a defendant pleading guilty, does it also apply when counsel’s de-
ficient conduct results in a plea that is not accepted, and a defendant 
is convicted after an otherwise fair trial? 
The Supreme Court answered the above question in the af-
firmative on March 21, 2012, in two companion cases, Lafler v. 
Cooper71 and Missouri v. Frye.72  These cases dealt with the issue of 
when “inadequate assistance of counsel caused nonacceptance of a 
plea offer and further proceedings led to a less favorable outcome.”73 
In Lafler, defendant was charged with “assault with intent to 
murder, possession of a firearm by a felon, [and] possession of a fire-
arm in the commission of a felony.”74  In speaking with the lower 
court, defendant admitted guilt and “expressed a willingness” to 
 
65 Id. at 1481-82. 
66 Id. at 1482. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1483. 
69 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483-84.  Additionally, the Court, at the request of the Solicitor 
General, refused to limit ineffective assistance claims during plea bargaining to only “af-
firmative misadvice” on grounds it would lead to “absurd results.”  See id. at 1184 (stating 
that limiting claims to affirmative misadvice would encourage counsel to give no advice 
even when the answer is clear). 
70 Id. at 1486. 
71 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
72 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
73 Lafler, 132. S. Ct. at 1382-83. 
74 Id. at 1383. 
8
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plead to one count of the indictment in exchange for a recommended 
sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months.75  However, defendant 
twice rejected the offer on the erroneous advice from his counsel that 
the prosecutor could not establish the requisite intent “because [the 
victim] had been shot below the waist.”76  However, at trial, defend-
ant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to a minimum of 185 
to 360 months.77 
In Frye, defendant was charged with driving with a revoked 
license, a crime he had been previously convicted of on three prior 
occasions.78  The prosecutor offered a choice of two bargains: in ex-
change for a felony plea the prosecution would recommend ten days 
in jail, or in exchange for a misdemeanor plea the prosecution would 
recommend a sentence of ninety days in jail.79  However, counsel 
failed to advise defendant of either offer and both lapsed.80  Shortly 
before his preliminary hearing, defendant was again arrested for driv-
ing with a revoked license and as a result, openly pled to the charges 
and received a sentence of three years.81 
While the Court in Lafler and Frye recognized that there is no 
right to a plea bargain,82 it recognized that the nature of the modern 
criminal justice system is one of pleas, not trials.83  Therefore, for 
upwards of ninety-four percent of defendants,84 the effective assis-
tance of counsel consists almost entirely of securing a favorable 
plea.85  The Court rejected the argument that “an otherwise fair” trial 
cures any defect in counsel’s representation in securing a plea bar-
gain.86  It stated that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assis-





78 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1404-05. 
82 Id. at 1406 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977)); see also Lafler, 
132 S. Ct. at 1387. 
83 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
84 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
85 Id. 
86 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386. 
9
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as a whole, not simply a fair trial.87  In applying Strickland to rejected 
pleas, the Court held that the standard is whether there is a “reasona-
ble probability the plea offer would have been presented to the court, 
. . . that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the convic-
tion or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been 
less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were 
imposed.”88 
In sum, under the federal approach the backbone of the right 
to the effective assistance of counsel is the legitimacy of the adver-
sarial process as a whole.89  However, the two-prong test of Strick-
land, which requires deficient conduct and prejudice, was limited to 
the right to a fair trial.90  However, in Hill, the Court expanded Strick-
land to include erroneous pre-trial advice which results in a guilty 
plea.91  Under Padilla, the Court again widened the scope of Strick-
land to include incorrect deportation advice when it is relied upon in 
entering a guilty plea.92  Finally, in Lafler, the Court again widened 
the scope of ineffective assistance to include deficient conduct which 
causes the “nonacceptance” of a plea which is followed by “an oth-
erwise fair trial.”93 
IV. THE NEW YORK APPROACH TO THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
As discussion of the federal approach begins with Strickland, 
discussion of the New York approach begins with People v. Baldi.94  
In Baldi, defendant, Joseph Baldi, was convicted of murder in the se-
 
87 Id. at 1387-88.  The Court noted that Strickland concerned itself with the fairness of a 
trial, but here the fairness concern involves the process which precedes the trial.  Id. at 1388. 
88 Id. at 1385. 
89 See id. at 1388 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process 
that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 686)). 
90 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
91 Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59. 
92 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.  The Court also refused to limit ineffective assistance 
claims to only “affirmative misadvice” by counsel.  Id. at 1484. 
93 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. 
94 429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1981). 
10
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cond degree.95  At issue was counsel’s “innovative” tactics where he 
testified as to his client’s mental state and disclosed that defendant 
confessed in a “trance-like state.”96 
On appeal, defendant raised the issue that counsel did not pur-
sue the defense of factual innocence; however, the court did not find 
this fact constituted ineffective assistance.97  In fashioning its test as 
to whether a defendant received the effective assistance of counsel, 
the court evaluated whether the defendant received meaningful assis-
tance determined by a totality of circumstances.98  The court found 
that the tactics used by counsel, while uncommon, were not entirely 
unheard of in New York.99  The court emphasized that “[h]indsight 
should not escalate what may have been a few tactical errors into in-
effective assistance of counsel.”100  Finding that counsel put all of his 
years of experience to work for defendant in his representation, the 
court held that defendant received effective assistance based on the 
totality of circumstances.101 
In People v. Benevento,
102
 the New York Court of Appeals 
declined to adopt the Strickland test on state constitutional 
grounds.103  Notable in Benevento is the great length the court went 
into explaining that meaningful representation is concerned first with 
whether a defendant received a fair trial.104  However, the court ra-
tionalized that the Constitution of New York is “concerned as much 
with the integrity of the judicial process as with the issue of guilt or 
innocence” and defended its refusal to enforce the harmless error rule 
when a claim of ineffective assistance has been substantiated.105  
While Benevento elaborated on why New York has adhered to Baldi, 
the question still remains on how the Baldi test applies to plea bar-
 
95 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 404. 
96 Id. at 402-04. 
97 Id. at 405-07. 
98 Id. at 405. 
99 Id. at 407 (citing People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1962); People v. Garrow, 379 
N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1976)). 
100 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 407. 
101 Id. at 408. 
102 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584. 
103 Id. at 589. 
104 Id. at 588. 
105 Id. (quoting People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d 628, 631 (N.Y. 1963)). 
11
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gains. 
A leading case in New York regarding the application of ef-
fective assistance to plea bargains is People v. Fernandez.106  In this 
memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals adopted the Appellate 
Division, Third Department’s holding in People v. Rogers107 that the 
“defendant had the burden to demonstrate ‘that a plea offer was 
made, that defense counsel failed to inform him of that offer, and that 
he would have been willing to accept the offer.’ ”108 
New York, like the federal courts, also gives deference to 
counsel’s actions.109  Additionally, the Court of Appeals has refused 
to implement the Strickland prejudice requirement, preferring to have 
the requirement of prejudice be but one factor in a court’s overall de-
termination of whether defendant received meaningful representa-
tion.110  Finally, the Court of Appeals in applying the amorphous 
Baldi test to plea bargains, adopted a formulaic approach.  A defend-
ant must prove an offer was made, counsel failed to convey the offer, 
and the defendant would have accepted its terms.111 
V. RECONCILING THE FEDERAL & NEW YORK APPROACHES 
TO CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
DURING PLEA BARGAINING 
While the Federal and New York approaches to claims of in-
effective assistance of counsel differ, they are both motivated by the 
same underlying purpose: to ensure the legitimacy of the judicial sys-
tem.112  The Supreme Court stated in Strickland that in order to satis-
 
106 836 N.E.2d 1144 (N.Y. 2005) (per curiam). 
107 780 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2004). 
108 Fernandez, 836 N.E.2d at 1144 (quoting Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 396). 
109 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 407 (“Hindsight should not escalate what may have been a few 
tactical errors into ineffective assistance of counsel”); People v. Satterfield, 488 N.E.2d 834, 
836-37 (N.Y. 1985) (“It is not for this court to second-guess whether a course chosen by de-
fendant’s counsel was the best trial strategy, or even a good one, so long as defendant was 
afforded meaningful representation.”); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
110 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588. 
111 Fernandez, 836 N.E.2d at 1144. 
112 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffective-
ness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adver-
sarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.” (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686)); Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588. 
12
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fy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, the defendant must be 
afforded counsel who plays the role of the adversary envisioned by 
the Sixth Amendment.113  This requirement is predicated by the fact 
that our legal system is adversarial, and adversarial testing ensures 
confidence in the outcome of any proceeding.114  In addition to the 
deficient conduct requirement, Strickland requires an additional 
showing of prejudice, or that but for the conduct of counsel, defend-
ant would have received a more favorable outcome.115  However, the 
New York Court of Appeals has forgone this requirement and instead 
prefers that prejudice be only a factor in the determination of whether 
a defendant has been afforded meaningful representation.116 
While the Federal and New York approaches differ in regards 
to claims of ineffective assistance, both approaches as applied to plea 
bargains are quite similar.117  Under the federal approach, the Su-
preme Court stated in Lafler that “a defendant must show that but for 
the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that 
the plea offer would have been presented to the court, . . . that the 
court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sen-
tence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe 
than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.”118  
Within these requirements the two-part test of Strickland can be dis-
cerned.  The first requirement of Strickland is contained in the re-
quirement that there be a reasonable probability the offer would be 
presented to and accepted by the court.119  The second requirement of 
Strickland, or the prejudice requirement, is embodied in the require-
ment that a defendant receive a sentence that is harsher than the of-
fered plea.120  However, this requirement is unnecessary.  The fun-
damental nature of plea bargaining entails that the offer be more 
favorable than the consequences of being convicted after a trial, and 
 
113 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 687. 
116 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588. 
117 Compare Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385 (federal approach), with Fernandez, 836 N.E.2d at 
1144 (New York approach). 
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thus the requirement of prejudice appears illusory.121  This is because 
in instances where a defendant is convicted after a fair trial, a claim 
of ineffective assistance would not be raised if he or she received a 
more favorable sentence than the offered plea.122 
Under the New York approach to plea bargains, a defendant 
must prove there was an offer, counsel failed to convey the offer, and 
he or she would have accepted its terms.123  This formulaic approach 
is similar to its federal counterpart.  While not an express requirement 
of prejudice, the requirement that a defendant show he or she would 
have accepted the offer appears to serve the same purpose as its fed-
eral counterpart, to demonstrate that the defendant was prejudiced by 
the verdict.124  Finally, while the New York approach lacks the addi-
tional distinction present in the federal approach, that the court ac-
cepts the plea, this may simply reflect the fact that judges in the fed-
eral system are not bound by the terms of a plea bargain.125 
VI. EFFECTIVELY APPLYING THE STANDARDS 
The court in Verni addressed the differences between Federal 
and New York law effectively.  The Verni court first addressed the 
two competing standards by briefly citing the applicable law.126  
Next, the court analyzed defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance 
under New York law and found that defendant did not allege he 
would have accepted the offer (or any offer), a “condition precedent 
to [] relief.”127  The court also found that there was an “insufficient 
basis” to find that a firm offer was made.128  The court noted that 
while there was discussion of a plea containing a mental health com-
ponent, it was merely to gauge whether defendant was receptive to 
 
121 Contra id (describing that “the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms 
would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were im-
posed”). 
122 It is also likely to be frivolous.  In order to demonstrate that a defendant would have 
accepted the terms of plea it would appear that self-serving testimony is required.  Therefore, 
it also appears to be an illusory requirement. 
123 Fernandez, 836 N.E.2d at 1144. 
124 Id. at 1144. 
125 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). 
126 Verni, 2012 WL 1059382, at *2-*3. 
127 Id. at *4. 
128 Id. at *5. 
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such an offer, and absent was any discussion of the ultimate sentence 
defendant would plead to.129  The court found that because there was 
“no meeting of the minds,” the discussions did not constitute a cog-
nizable offer, and thus there could be no failure to convey.130  Having 
established a sufficient basis to make its determination under New 
York law, the court then discussed the applicable federal law.131 
The court first cited Strickland and then discussed the recent 
decisions of Lafler and Frye.132  After summarily noting the applica-
ble federal law, the court then applied the law to the case at hand and 
found that the defendant failed to establish that he would have ac-
cepted the offer, the court would have accepted the offer, and he 
would have received a lesser sentence.133  The court then held that de-
fendant’s claim of ineffective assistance was “unsupported in fact or 
law.”134 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The approaches taken by the New York and federal courts 
arise from the same fundamental concern, the legitimacy our judicial 
system.135  In Frye, the Supreme Court recognized that our modern 
system of criminal justice entails that for most defendants the effec-
tive assistance of counsel is comprised of securing a favorable 
plea.136  While claims of ineffective assistance provide counsel’s ac-
tions at trial with a strong presumption of reasonableness,137 it is logi-
cal because of the crucial role and respect that our system provides 
for a jury’s verdict.  However, in the context of plea bargains, errors 
by counsel are potentially magnified, because a judge who oversees 
the process has only limited information, and there is no jury of de-
fendant’s peers to serve as a final safeguard to the defendant’s rights.  
 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at *5. 
131 Verni, 2012 WL 1059382, at *5. 
132 Id. at *5-*6. 
133 Id. at *5-*7. 
134 Id. at *6. 
135 See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388; Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 588-89. 
136 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
137 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; People v. Meyers, 632 N.Y.S.2d 461 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t. 
1995). 
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Therefore, in a plea bargain setting, confidence in the outcome is far 
distinguishable than after a trial.  Since our judicial system is one of 
pleas not trials,138 is it not more important? 
When applying both the Federal and New York tests for inef-
fective assistance of counsel, as applied to plea bargaining, it may be-
labor the facts to analyze both, but because each approach is formula-
ic, the necessity of including each element cannot be stressed enough.  
In Hill, the Supreme Court dismissed defendant’s claim for failure to 
state that he suffered prejudice, a requirement that had yet to be enu-
merated as Strickland had not yet been applied to plea bargains,139 
and prejudice was not required under McMann.140  The same holds 
true under Verni as that court stated defendant’s claim for failure to 
state that he would have accepted the terms of the plea was “a condi-
tion precedent to [] relief.”141  As stated earlier, both the Federal and 
New York approaches require a defendant demonstrate that he suf-
fered prejudice.  However, while the requirement of prejudice is rele-
vant to claims of ineffective assistance arising from a counsel’s error 
at trial, it appears illusory when applied to plea bargains because the 
very nature of plea bargaining has ensured that a defendant has suf-
fered prejudice.  While it was admirable and pragmatic for the Su-
preme Court to recognize that the criminal justice system is a “system 
of pleas, not a system of trials,” it did not delve far enough into the 
nature of plea bargaining itself.142  By perpetuating the requirement 
of prejudice for plea bargains, the Supreme Court allows the oppor-
tunity for claims of ineffective assistance to be dismissed not on mer-
it, but mere technicality, and thus has undermined the primary pur-
pose of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 






138 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
139 Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. 
140 McMann, 397 U.S. at 770. 
141 Verni, 2012 WL 1059382, at *4. 
142 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
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